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Chapter  9
ID Scanners and Überveillance 
in the Night-Time Economy:
Crime Prevention or Invasion of Privacy?
ABSTRACT
ID scanners are promoted as an effective solution to the problems of anti-social behavior and violence 
in many urban nighttime economies. However, the acceptance of this and other forms of computerized 
surveillance to prevent crime and anti-social behavior is based on several unproven assumptions. After 
outlining what ID scanners are and how they are becoming a normalized precondition of entry into 
one Australian nighttime economy, this chapter demonstrates how technology is commonly viewed as 
the key to preventing crime despite recognition of various problems associated with its adoption. The 
implications of technological determinism amongst policy makers, police, and crime prevention theories 
are then critically assessed in light of several issues that key informants talking about the value of ID 
scanners fail to mention when applauding their success. Notably, the broad, ill-defined, and confused 
notion of “privacy” is analyzed as a questionable legal remedy for the growing problems of überveillance.
INTRODUCTION
Many metropolitan and regional areas are trying 
to enrich night-time economies that have been 
traditionally centered on alcohol consumption. It 
is therefore not surprising that a rise in anti-social 
behavior, violence, serious interpersonal crime, 
and associated concerns over personal health, 
safety and environmental amenity, generate many 
contentious policy interventions (Hadfield et al., 
2009). Governments appear keen to be seen as 
responsive to community concerns over the lack 
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of security in the night-time economy. However, 
there are considerable doubts over whether the 
complex range of spatial, patron-based or regula-
tory interventions actually changes the behavior 
of nightclub patrons.
The ID scanner has emerged as a key method of 
increasing surveillance in many night-time econo-
mies throughout Australia, the United Kingdom, 
Canada and the United States. An extensive report 
into surveillance in public places by the Victorian 
Law Reform Commission (VLRC) highlights the 
reach of contemporary digital surveillance, by 
illustrating that:
[i]dentification scanners record the image and 
written details on an individual’s driving license or 
other identity card, including their name and ad-
dress. Facial recognition software scans patrons’ 
faces as they enter the nightclub and matches those 
images against a database of photos. In this way 
the software can be used to identify patrons who 
have been previously banned from a venue. The 
software can be shared among venues (VLRC, 
2010, p. 40).
These systems use inexpensive and accessible 
‘technologies for a new, security-driven purpose’ 
(Goold et al., 2010, p. 21). They are particularly 
attractive to large venues where the scale of pa-
tronage complicates security provision. They are 
appealing to both governments and private busi-
nesses for simultaneously promising improved 
public safety and increased revenue.
The Law, Justice and Safety Committee for the 
Legislative Assembly of Queensland (QLALJSC, 
2010) provides a rare examination of the role of 
ID scanners in licensed venues. This analysis 
is useful, as it provides insight into how the 
potential benefits of this technology appear to 
have greater political credence than the various 
problems associated with information security. 
The perceived benefits of ID scanning identified 
by the Committee are:
•	 Aiding in detection of offenders, with the 
scanned information able to be retrieved 
from the data base and provided to police;
•	 Acting as a deterrent, as potential offenders 
know that their personal details have been 
recorded and can be provided to police; 
and
•	 Providing information to support a ban of 
the offender from that venue, and in some 
cases other venues as well (QLALJSC, 
2010, p. 25).
The first two benefits suggest scanned data is a 
valuable method of enhancing the detection of of-
fenders, or deterring potential anti-social behavior. 
However, there is no evidence these objectives are 
realized in practice (Palmer et al., 2010). Further, 
networked data sharing has proactive value in 
warning other venues of troublesome individuals 
identified in these systems. This enhances their 
deterrence capabilities amongst licensed venues 
with network access, but overlooks the potential 
displacement of anti-social behavior to surround-
ing areas.
Despite considerable support amongst the 
liquor industry (QLALJSC, 2010, p. 25), the 
Queensland Office of the Information Commis-
sioner documented several concerns over the 
need for using personal data collection, storage 
and dissemination to curb problematic alcohol-
fuelled behavior. Notably, current state and federal 
privacy laws may not apply to venues that have 
introduced ID scanners or companies that install 
and manage this technology. Table 1 summarizes 
various unresolved privacy issues identified in the 
Queensland Information Commissioner’s submis-
sion that could be addressed through alternative 
harm reduction methods.
Despite these concerns, the report recom-
mended licensees trading after midnight should 
be encouraged to install ID scanning systems with 
‘due regard to privacy issues and matters of 
natural justice’ (Queensland Parliament, 2010, p. 
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27), and proposed a discounted license fee struc-
ture for venues adopting this technology. How-
ever, the report is silent on what ‘due regard’ or 
‘natural justice’ might entail. This demonstrates 
that governments consider privacy can be readily 
overridden when it comes to combating alcohol-
related disorder. Interestingly, the Committee’s 
interim report cautioned against recommending 
networked ID scanning systems until concerns 
over information privacy, data storage and main-
tenance were resolved.
An important issue raised with a system of net-
worked ID scanners relates to privacy, in par-
ticular the collection and storage of this sensitive 
information. The committee recognizes that the 
safety of patrons and the protection of their identity 
documents are paramount. These issues need to 
be closely considered before any recommendation 
can be made on this matter (QLALJSC, 2009, p. 8). 
The willingness to sidestep privacy impli-
cations of crime prevention technologies has 
considerable impacts on those administering 
these measures at individual sites where they are 
deployed, the public police, system developers 
and the broader community. Of particular concern 
is how ‘back end data’ (Greenleaf, 2007, p. 7) is 
used once a person’s individual details are entered 
into a scanning system. Table 2 summarizes the 
unanswered questions contained in the Informa-
tion Commissioner’s detailed submission, but 
remained ignored in the final report.
The widespread public and political concern 
over alcohol-related violence has rapidly contrib-
uted to an expansion of ID scanners in Australia’s 
licensed venues at the expense of other citizen 
rights or protections. However, there is little clar-
ity surrounding the desired regulatory and ac-
countability relationships between the state, a 
scanning company or database administrator and 
the patron. These problems are common to the 
introduction of new technologies and emerging 
forms of e-governance. By viewing these develop-
ment outside the lens of crime prevention, and as 
extensions of many forms of contemporary e-
governance, it is possible to gain a greater ap-
preciation of the limits of how new technology is 
adopted, its implications in light of contemporary 
developments in surveillance and überveillance 
and to in turn glean new and meaningful insights 
into possible methods of better regulating their 
use.
Table 1. Summary of privacy concerns by Queensland Information Commissioner (QLALJSC, 2010, 
pp. 25-26) 
Potential breaches of Federal privacy legislation, including arbitrary 
interference with individual privacy principles where venues have 
an annual turnover of less than $3 million per annum
Other less intrusive technologies might achieve reductions in 
violence and antisocial behavior, such as the rolling out of blood 
alcohol testing machines and colorless ultra-violet sprays
The tenuous causal link between alcohol and violence and 
misconceptions about this link amongst the broader public
Various other harm minimization strategies to combat violence in 
and around licensed premises warrant further policy consideration
The status of some venues which ‘are known to be more violent 
than others and at particular times’
Conflicts between the financial gains from selling alcohol and 
principles of responsible service
The potential disproportionate policy response of ID scanners and 
CCTV to the general problem of alcohol-related violence, which 
occurs in a range of public environments other than licensed venues
The need to focus on planning, licensing and price regulation or 
liquor taxation laws in moderating drinking culture and assisting 
with minimizing alcohol-related violence
The impact of ID scanners on the privacy of most people who 
attend licensed venues at the expense of a small minority of people 
who engage in violent behavior
The lack of evidence to support the deterrence effect of ID 
scanners and the use of scanners as an ‘all seeing eye for law 
enforcement’ by police and liquor establishments
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TECHNOLOGY, SECURITY AND 
DIGITAL GOVERNANCE
It is easy to fall into a theoretical and method-
ological trap that equates the introduction of a new 
technology with reductions in crime or anti-social 
behavior. However, Matthews (2009) demonstrates 
a seemingly obvious link between installing a 
CCTV camera in a car park and reduced car theft 
can overlook potential causal explanations that, 
if ignored, help reinforce the perceived success 
of new technological innovations.
…[I]t could be because potential offenders are 
deterred, more are caught and prosecuted, more 
people might use a car park thus making it safer 
or the increased publicity associated with the in-
troduction of cameras may serve to deter or deflect 
potential criminals … all these hypotheses need to 
be examined and assessed while it is recognized 
that the context – the size, location, design and the 
like – or the deployment of CCTV will influence 
the outcome (Matthews, 2009, p. 356).
Governments and private entities commonly 
embrace untested technologies to streamline 
manual bureaucratic processes, business perfor-
mance, security and identity verification (Senate 
Standing Committee on Finance and Public Ad-
ministration, 2007; Greenleaf, 2007a; Greenleaf, 
2007b; Hart, 2007). Lips et al. (2009) indicate that 
organizational streamlining and improved service 
delivery are standard justifications to support new 
technologies and forms of surveillance, which 
promise ‘perfect enforcement’ (Mulligan, 2008) 
to enhance financial or interpersonal security. The 
benefits of heightened efficiency, accuracy, secu-
rity and service delivery (Taylor et al., 2008) appear 
self-validating and beyond question, even if there 
is limited research supporting their realization.
The implications of auto-generated data on no-
tions of responsible and participatory citizenship 
are only beginning to be understood. Dataveillance 
can generate ‘particularized’ as opposed to rights-
based or universal citizenship (Lips et al., 2009, p. 
731), with the capacity to exacerbate community 
‘segmentation’. When linked to quasi-criminal 
laws or ‘multiple hybrid, civil, contractual, and 
administrative’ legal requirements, a growing body 
of ‘irregular citizens’, including ‘antisocial youth, 
persistent offenders, sexual and violent offenders, 
and suspected terrorists’ (Zender, 2010, p. 389; 
394-397), commonly bear the brunt of tighter risk 
classifications that undermine their full citizenship 
Table 2. Unresolved privacy issues identified by the Queensland Information Commissioner (QLALJSC, 
2010, pp. 26-27) 
Will the transfer of personal information be limited to those found 
guilty of a crime or misdemeanor in a licensed venue, or will it 
extend to anyone that has committed a crime or misdemeanor or to 
anyone a licensee would rather not have in their premises?
Will police be able to access the information when investigating 
the whereabouts of interested persons, establishing alibis in 
unrelated crimes, including using licensed premises databases of 
fingerprints as an extension of police records?
To whom can a patron complain if they find themselves unjustly 
placed on a blacklist, perhaps because someone used a fraudulent 
government ID the scanner could not detect?
Will it be shared only between licensed premises owned by 
the same legal entity, or between all other licensed premises, 
regardless of who owns them, including restaurants?
What training will be provided to licensed premise employees to 
ensure all personal information is handled appropriately?
What mechanisms will be put in place to ensure the information 
is accurate and up to date? What safeguards will surround the 
sharing?
Will the length of the ban be proportionate to the seriousness of the 
anti-social behavior?
Who will decide whether a misdemeanor is serious enough to 
warrant blacklisting?
What mechanisms will there be for a person to challenge their 
placement on a ‘ban list’?
Will it be shared between interstate licensed premises? 
Internationally?
Will patrons be banned for non-criminal behavior? How will the identity of the person be confirmed?
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status. For example, in Britain the introduction 
of up to 1000 new offences over the last decade 
(Matthews, 2009, p. 315), largely targeting minor 
or trivial forms of incivility with the goal of pre-
venting more serious crime (von Hirsch & Simister, 
2006), combined with the erosion of conventional 
due process requirements that protect individuals 
from state intrusion, is contingent on using new 
forms of surveillance technology to enforce more 
complex forms of administrative, legal and social 
sorting. Increasingly, knowledge generated about 
‘good’ and ‘bad’ conduct is constructed, shared 
and monopolized by public and private agencies 
that convert ‘common information sources [about 
‘irregular citizens’] into exclusive knowledge 
resources’ (O’Connor and De Lint, 2009, p. 59). 
Technology therefore consolidates sophisticated 
enforcement networks in promoting greater se-
curity or ‘assessing and constructing citizens’ 
digital footprints, which then constitute the basis 
for setting an individual’s trust profile’ (Lips et 
al., 2009, p. 730). However, these processes are 
given practical meaning when informed by laws 
and bureaucratic strategies that promote new forms 
of citizenship, rights and accountability while 
restricting an individual’s capacity to formally 
contest these processes.
In identifying a package of reforms aimed 
at combating anti-social behavior through the 
increased surveillance of ‘at risk’ young people 
in New South Wales, Osmond (2010) documents 
a sophisticated automated and networked data 
matching system operating across several govern-
ment departments, which is justified in the overall 
public interest of reducing crime, improving com-
munity safety and preventing identified individuals 
from graduating into adult criminal careers. These 
processes aim to produce a more effective, inten-
sive and personalized case management system 
that simultaneously nullifies any countervailing 
privacy concerns. Those ‘at risk’ youth siphoned 
into the dataveillance network become guinea pigs 
for a new form of citizen oversight that bears a 
striking resemblance to überveillance (Michael & 
Michael, 2008). Überveillance refers to a society 
where everyone is always watched or watchable, 
with individual liberty, responsibility, indepen-
dence or retreat from the viewer’s gaze impossible 
(Clarke, 2010). Increasingly, ‘irregular citizens’ 
face the allied risk their lives become defined 
by an intrusive web of digital surveillance and 
abstracted interpretations of the data, rather than 
their actual conduct.
Of course, the surveillance of at risk popu-
lations is by no means a new development. 
Thompson and Genosko (2009) offer a fascinating 
account of the punch card system that recorded 
all takeaway liquor sales by the Liquor Control 
Board of Ontario between 1927 and 1975. This 
system relied on rigid bureaucratic categories to 
give meaning to the abstracted data, which pigeon-
holed ‘at risk’ individuals into arbitrary categories, 
then justified tight paternalistic surveillance by 
local liquor distributors that was in turn overseen 
by provincial authorities. This system validated 
several pre-existing restrictions on the ability of 
individuals to purchase alcohol, such as prohibi-
tions targeting First Nations people who did not 
renounce their Indian identity (R. v. Webb, 1943). 
A formal legal challenge in 1974 (Ontario (Liquor 
Control Board) v. Keupfer, 1974) helped trigger 
the collapse of this highly cumbersome dataveil-
lance system. However, the eventual demise of 
this model under its own bureaucratic weight is 
secondary to the fact it took almost fifty-years 
to successfully challenge its autocratic power 
structure through the Canadian courts.
Moving beyond this historical example, au-
tomated digital sorting is now embedded within 
many e-citizenship and private consumer transac-
tions, including international travel, passport and 
temporary visa authentication, access to public 
or private sector buildings or entry into major 
sporting events. The digitized tracking of citizens 
by governments occurs within a tightening of bu-
reaucratic sorting criteria under the law. While it 
is debatable whether the processes of monitoring 
citizen activity have changed to accommodate 
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these uses of technology (Manning, 2008), the 
legal power structures that underpin them have. 
Therefore, ‘new administrative sorting practices… 
[that] lead to new forms of citizen segmenta-
tion: those who can be trusted according to their 
digital footprint, and those who cannot’ (Lips et 
al., 2009, p. 731) are invariably informed by new 
legal regimes that reconfigure ideals of state ac-
countability and citizen capacity to challenge the 
uses of data trails.
The logic of increased security, crime preven-
tion or greater community protection enables 
digital surveillance to compile more detailed 
and potentially accurate information on people 
and their activities. However, the ‘back end’ 
assemblages of this data that sanction arbitrary 
classifications, interpretations, reinterpretations 
and reconstructions to manufacture new forms of 
‘truth’ is increasingly unchallengeable under ‘law 
against law’ (Ericson, 2007, p. 24).
Privacy is often cited as a central legal counter-
measure to challenge intrusive dataveillance and 
social sorting practices. However, it is virtually 
impossible to come to a ‘satisfactory definition 
of ‘privacy’’ (New South Wales Law Reform 
Commission, 2009, p. 3) that can meaningfully 
challenge the ‘truth’ of a problematic surveillant 
assemblage. When viewed in its legal rather than 
popular sense, the right to privacy and its enforce-
ment is extremely limited in protecting individuals 
from public and private sector agencies that gather 
and use personal data.
AUSTRALIAN PRIVACY LAWS
Privacy law imposes certain constraints on the 
capacity of state or federal public sector agencies, 
and the private sector, on the gathering, use, stor-
age and dissemination of personal information. 
Leman-Langlois (2008, p. 113) offers a five-point 
definition of ‘privacy’ that refines these issues in 
a social context where personal data is commonly 
provided to access public or private services.
•	 Control Over Information: Including 
the assurance that personal information 
will be used according to contractual 
arrangements;
•	 Secrecy of Information: Including the 
ability to escape surveillance or protect 
against unwanted prying, or access to 
anonymity;
•	 Desire to Protect Personal Space: 
Involving the psychological need to retreat 
to non-social space (even if this might be 
in the public arena) to engage in individual 
activities;
•	 Right to Keep Secrets: Involving rules de-
fining institutional, social, political or ad-
ministrative limits to collecting and shar-
ing information;
•	 Data Security: Including the develop-
ment of appropriate technical safeguards 
against unauthorized access to protected 
information.
How these issues are operationalized as a legal 
right to privacy is more complex. Divisions of 
responsibility between Australian state and federal 
laws magnify these problems, to ensure that even 
if privacy is enshrined as a basic human right, its 
enforcement in practice is extremely difficult.
In Victoria the Charter of Human Rights and 
Responsibilities Act (2006) stipulates a right to 
privacy is enforceable against Parliament, courts, 
tribunals or relevant statutory authorities (Charter 
of Human Rights and Responsibilities Act, 2006, 
sections 38 and 6) unless a suspected breach can 
be validated under a competing national law. Under 
Section 13 a citizen has the right:
1.  Not to have his or her privacy, family, home 
or correspondence unlawfully or arbitrarily 
interfered with; and
2.  Not to have his or her reputation unlawfully 
attacked.
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However, the term ‘privacy’ is undefined in the 
Charter. Schedule 1 of the Information Privacy Act 
(Victoria) (2000), equivalent national legislation 
(Privacy Act (Commonwealth), 1988) and laws 
governing the use of listening, optical, tracking 
and data surveillance technologies by public 
agencies to monitor private activity (Surveillance 
Devices Act (Victoria), 1999) provide some guid-
ance on the meaning of ‘privacy’. Both the state 
and federal laws establish base standards for the 
collection and use of personal information, with 
state law focusing on the activities of public or 
private agencies undertaking contracted govern-
ment functions. The most compelling definition 
under Victorian law relates to ‘private activity’, 
which involves:
… an activity carried on in circumstances that may 
reasonably be taken to indicate that the parties 
to it desire it to be observed only by themselves, 
but does not include:
1.  An activity carried on outside a building; or
2.  An activity carried on in any circumstances 
in which the parties to it ought reasonably to 
expect that it may be observed by someone 
else (Surveillance Devices Act (Victoria), 
1999, section 3).
Both state and federal privacy laws articu-
late a series of key privacy principles that are 
recognized under International law (Privacy Act 
(Commonwealth), 1988, Section 6C). Federal 
law only applies to private businesses that have 
an annual financial turnover of $ 3 million or 
more. Table 3 identifies the main ‘information 
privacy principles’ enshrined in Victorian and 
Commonwealth law. All government and private 
organizations covered by these laws must adhere 
to this combination of guidelines relating to 
the gathering, dissemination or use of personal 
information.
Federal law enables an industry to work with 
the national Privacy Commission to develop a 
Code of Conduct that incorporates the privacy 
principles. However, these restrictions can be 
waived under both Victorian and federal law where 
the ‘prevention, detection, investigation, prosecu-
tion or punishment of criminal offences’ is con-
cerned (see Privacy Act (Commonwealth), 1988, 
Schedule 3 (6)(j)(i); Information Privacy Act 
(Victoria), Schedule 1, 2.1(d)-(h)).
In 2006 the biometrics industry had developed 
a formally approved Code of Conduct (Office of 
the Information Privacy Commissioner, 2006), 
which could be translated to the use of ID scan-
ning technologies. However, this voluntary Code 
has only four signatories and has been widely 
criticized for offering citizens minimal protection 
‘beyond the default requirements of the Privacy 
Act’ (Australian Privacy Foundation, 2010). More 
problematically, many common uses of surveil-
lance technology in public places ‘are likely to 
be beyond the reach of privacy laws’ (VLRC, 
2010, p. 24). Nevertheless, clear standards for 
regulating public and privately managed closed 
circuit television systems (CCTV) are common. 
However, as voluntary industry-based codes of 
practice, it is debatable how detailed guidelines 
developed by organizations such as the Australian 
Privacy Foundation (2010; Clarke, 2010), requir-
ing community consultation to ensure CCTV 
use remains proportional to the social benefits it 
aims to produce, appropriate controls on the use, 
disclosure, publication and cyclical destruction of 
CCTV data, and periodic review of the viability 
of individual systems to ensure compliance with 
these principles, are incorporated to protect 
citizens from the expansion of uberveillance. It 
also remains debatable how these principles are 
enshrined or enforced in practice, or whether they 
impact on newly emerging forms of computerized 
or biometric surveillance permeating the security 
landscape of the public or private sector.
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Greenleaf et al. (2007) indicate that compli-
ance with these complex privacy requirements is 
more difficult to achieve where public sector data 
management services are subcontracted to private 
service providers. However, a more problematic 
series of issues arises in a political context where 
privacy is juxtaposed against other individual or 
collective rights associated with human security. 
The recent growth of ID scanners in the Australian 
night-time economy offers a pertinent case study 
into the limits of contemporary privacy law in its 
own right, and as a counterpoint to more puni-
tive conceptions of anti-social behavior that are 
governed by tighter laws to promote public safety 
that are impervious to legal challenge or based on 
popular misconceptions about the effectiveness of 
new surveillance technologies.
LIQUOR LICENSEES’ 
VIEWS OF PRIVACY
After a spate of violent incidents in and around 
the nightclub precinct of the Victorian regional 
city of Geelong between December 2006 and 
February 2007, the community’s police, venue 
licensees and local council sought concrete mea-
sures to regain control over disorderly night-time 
economy. In the ensuing months, several venues 
piloted ID scanners, and by November 2007, ten 
inner city venues participating in a voluntary 
Liquor Accord designed to improve practices 
associated with alcohol service had adopted this 
technology. Throughout 2008 and 2009, we con-
ducted a series of in-depth interviews with local 
police, councilors, venue licensees and door staff 
Table 3. Victorian and Federal information privacy principles 
General Principles Privacy Principles, Victoria 
Information Privacy Act 2000, Sch 1
Privacy Principles, National 
Privacy Act (Commonwealth) 1988, Sch 3
Data collection The organization must clearly communicate 
its identity and legal purpose for gathering the 
information
Personal information can only be collected if it is 
necessary for one or more organizational functions and is 
collected by ‘lawful’, ‘fair’ and unobtrusive methods
Use and disclosure Ensures that information can only be used or 
disclosed by the organization for specified 
purposes, such as ‘the prevention, detection, 
investigation, prosecution or punishment of 
criminal offences or breaches of a law’ or ‘the 
protection of public revenue’
Reasonable steps to inform the individual about the 
identity and contact details of the organization; the 
right for individuals to access any information and be 
informed of the purposes for its collection or disclosure; 
the main consequences to the individual if information 
is not disclosed; and the primary purpose or uses of the 
information
Data quality and 
accuracy
Aimed at preserving the accuracy of personal 
information that has been gathered and stored
The records relating to personal information are updated 
accurately
Data security Aimed at preventing unauthorized access and use Reasonable steps to protect personal data from misuse, 
loss or unauthorized access
Open policies Involve the development and communication of 
clear policies regarding data uses and management
Policies regarding the use and management of personal 
information are clear and accessible to individuals 
making a request
Right to access and 
correct data
This right applies unless access or correction 
compromise the rights of others or the conduct of 
criminal investigations
Information can be accessed and corrected by 
individuals providing their data unless there are justified 
reasons to the contrary
Trans-border data 
transfer
Prohibitions apply except in certain restricted 
circumstances
Restrictions relating to the foreign transfer of 
information
Bans on unique 
identifiers
Applicable unless these are necessary to undertake 
core organizational business
Anonymity To be preserved where practical
Sensitive information Citizen must provide consent on information about 
political preference, ethnicity, religion, trade union 
affiliation or criminal history
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examining perceptions of the effectiveness of ID 
scanners in reducing violence and the processes 
surrounding their normalization as a precondition 
of entry into all ‘at risk’ venues trading after 1 am 
(Palmer et al., 2010). While there was general ac-
ceptance ID scanners encouraged more behavioral 
accountability amongst nightclub patrons, the 
countervailing issue of privacy is of most interest 
to the present discussion.
Most respondents recognized the importance 
of privacy in relation to this form of surveillance. 
However, the interviews revealed few practical 
insights into how privacy is assured given the 
dominant purpose of this technology is to enhance 
personal safety in licensed venues. The concept of 
privacy was universally considered secondary or 
marginal to the overriding concern of combating 
serious violence and anti-social behavior in the 
Geelong nightclub precinct. As such, the popular 
conception of privacy as a right that is justifiably 
conceded or overridden by the more prominent 
concern of promoting safety is a consistent thread 
emerging in our data.
Those who question the privacy implications 
of ID scanners and the associated issues of data 
storage, maintenance and use, are most likely 
to be viewed as potential sources of violent or 
anti-social behavior. Under this view, privacy is 
not only considered an inconvenience by many 
respondents, but a sign that the person seeking to 
challenge the integrity of the ID scanning system 
is a troublemaker that should be denied entry into 
a participating venue.
People that walk in the place, if they’ve got any 
concerns about privacy – stay home, don’t go out, 
because I don’t care who gets my details, I haven’t 
done nothing wrong. I don’t think that should 
worry anyone. There’s more than scanners if you 
want to get details of someone, let’s be honest.
This view sidesteps the more pertinent issues 
of how privacy is protected according to current 
legislative requirements or the idea of responsible 
on-site administration of this technology. Those 
questioning the privacy integrity of ID scanning 
are showing a distinct mistrust of a system that is 
considered to have discernible benefits in promot-
ing greater security in the night-time economy. 
This degree of mistrust is equated with anti-social 
behavior. Therefore, it is better for people who 
have concerns over privacy to stay home, as to 
do otherwise demonstrates an intention to test a 
clearly beneficial system designed to enhance 
safety for all nightclub patrons.
Similarly, patrons who do not possess iden-
tification and attempt entry or express dismay 
at being rejected, it’s a further sign a person is 
likely to ‘cause trouble’. This view shows how 
the technology provides a paternalistic and pro-
tective benefit, which can be justified as ‘law’, 
while any attempt to use privacy to contest this 
new ‘law’ or failing to produce ID is considered 
to undermine the entire viability of this innovative 
safety measure.
…[T]he ones that come out without ID are the ones 
I think come out for not a good time … to cause 
trouble. They’ve got all these fanciful reasons in 
their heads with big imaginations as to why we’d 
want it, but it’s a safety tool. We just say provide 
law … you have to do it … all the clubs are doing 
it. If you go to the club down the road you are 
going to have the same problems there. You have 
to have your ID on you. If you get hit by a car we 
need to contact somebody. 
Leaving aside the stated concerns over road 
safety, the integrity of ID scanning is reinforced 
by its in-built technological protections, making 
it impervious to criticism. Any concerns over 
data integrity, such as possible misuses of data 
for marketing purposes, are again indicators of 
mistrust. By stressing how this element of privacy 
is preserved, the value of using scanned data to 
identify and ban troublesome patrons becomes 
self-validating.
[T]he first week we had a couple of people ring 
up complaining about where it’s going to be used, 
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but there are only 2 people at both ends that have 
got access to the scanner information, so we don’t 
use it for any marketing purposes … [I]n fact I 
don’t even know how to use it for stuff like that, 
so no one [here] has access to go into scanned 
details, so on a Monday if any of the managers 
has got a problem with that guy and we’ve got 
footage, we ban them …
Complaints about privacy issues were consid-
ered rare. When they did emerge, licensees indi-
cated they were countered by reminding patrons 
this technology is necessary to increase their safety. 
Eighteen-months after being first introduced, the 
process, and the safety justifications underlying it, 
became normalized: ‘everybody does it … [the] 
first thing everyone does at the door is pull it [their 
ID] out. This reinforces the attitude that privacy 
is considered an inconvenience when compared 
with improved safety in nightclubs. Trust is piv-
otal to interpreting how licensees view privacy. 
Trust applies to both the technological protections 
where database records are cleared every ’28 days 
or 30 days’ and the licensees’ direct assurances to 
patrons of the integrity of this surveillance system.
… [E]specially the ones from out of town who 
don’t know about it and don’t want to use it. ‘How 
do I know your not going to use it [the informa-
tion]?’ ‘You don’t know, but I’m telling you’, and I 
can’t remember if it’s 28 days or 30 days where it 
overrides itself … if they don’t do anything wrong, 
you’ve got no problems.
Although different venues have deployed 
different scanning technologies in Geelong, all 
systems can be configured to restrict a licensee’s 
ability to access or alter patron data. Technical 
requirements allowing for ‘password protected’ 
systems to restrict unauthorized access are con-
sidered to equate with privacy. This ensures only 
trusted or senior employees can access and modify 
individual patron records. Many of these issues 
relate to good business practice, which further 
validates their integrity, even if some venue man-
agers have consciously ‘avoided having to think 
about’ these issues.
I guess as licensees we were committed at the 
start that they wouldn’t be used for any untoward 
reasons. Other than the last person to scan as they 
go through you need a password to go back and 
look. So you can’t have dodgy security guys and 
door people going back looking up your address.
Privacy guidelines are communicated to all 
patrons upon entering each venue. However, the 
extent to which they are enforced or monitored for 
compliance remains unclear. All venues involved 
in this study referred to policies that inform pa-
trons of the privacy implications of ID scanning, 
but this does not necessarily preclude sharing 
scanned information with police to investigate 
criminal behavior. There is some sensitivity about 
data sharing even for the purposes of detecting a 
crime within a licensed venue. This is arguably 
due to the informality of the protocols for shar-
ing scanned data amongst police and other venue 
operators. This lack of clarity extends to the mo-
tives to justify sharing scanned data with police.
…[W]e all have our own privacy policy at the 
front door, or should have. I think you’d find 
that all the venues should have a privacy policy 
somewhere as you walk in. We all agreed … [that] 
if police wanted to come back and have a look at 
something they’d be made available. As far as I 
know everyone’s abided by that.
Most ID scanning systems are administered 
under a contractual arrangement between a 
licensed venue and the hardware and software 
manufacturers. As such, there is little incentive 
for individual licensees to consider the privacy 
implications of this technology, or interrogate 
how external providers administer the technology 
to protect individual privacy rights. For many 
venue operators adherence to lawful privacy re-
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quirements were considered beyond their direct 
responsibility. Their time is consumed by other 
licensing requirements that are more closely linked 
to business performance and improved safety. This 
reinforces the inconvenience privacy creates in 
the on site administration of ID scanning systems 
and how trust underpins the licensing role more 
generally to promote safety even through conten-
tious technological methods.
But if it’s tightly controlled and if we’re respon-
sible enough to hold a liquor license we should 
be responsible enough. There are probably some 
out there that like setting them up on databases, 
but they could get fined for that – there’s tough 
laws about that.
To supplement this data, several observations 
at late night venues where ID scanners have been 
installed were conducted during the research 
period. Figure 1 indicates that around 2/3rds of 
the 324 patrons interviewed considered ID scan-
ners an effective method of improving venue 
safety. This confirms similar findings from a 
study in Denver, Colorado, which suggests that 
patrons attending late-night venues express few 
concerns over information (Holloman & Ponder, 
2007). The vague legal environment that enables 
this process to occur in a largely unregulated 
context has several further implications, given 
the apparent lack of concordance between our 
respondents’ conceptions of privacy and other 
non-technological methods of improving safety 
within licensed venues.
DISCUSSION AND FUTURE 
RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
Trust, privacy, improved human security and the 
regulation of surveillance technologies are linked 
by a conflicting series of citizenship issues. When 
applied to technology through an e-governance 
perspective, the focus on trust examines how 
gathered data is used to promote safety and vali-
dated by those deploying increased surveillance 
at the expense of other countervailing rights or 
accountability mechanisms. Although technology 
can promote greater accuracy in monitoring hu-
man behavior and incorporate various measures 
to promote secure access and storage, privacy as 
a key conceptual vehicle to protect citizens has 
varied legal and cultural meanings. The ‘back 
end’ uses of data cause numerous problems, yet 
reinforce the overriding security benefits of this 
technology amongst those licensees deploying 
ID scanners as a condition of entry into ‘at risk’ 
venues. This reinforces the findings of Holloman 
Figure 1. Patron views on the effectiveness of ID scanners
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and Ponder’s examination of ID scanners in the US 
city of Denver, which encapsulates the problem of 
juxtaposing privacy with safety, while reinforcing 
a profound ambivalence towards privacy issues 
amongst citizens who attend licensed premises.
… [W]hile there is a general apathy about hav-
ing one’s driver’s license scanned, most people 
trust that the places scanning their licenses are 
not saving the information past the door. Of the 
people worried about their information being 
stored, very few believe that it is being used 
outside of the scope of ensuring a safe and legal 
atmosphere within the establishments … This 
general unawareness is a sign that businesses are 
not divulging what is actually happening when an 
ID is scanned, and that is a gross abuse of trust 
… when [these businesses] don’t consider their 
customers’ safety and privacy concerns, they are 
sending a very strong message that they don’t think 
about morality (Holloman & Ponder, 2007, p. 45).
For Goldsmith (2005), a lack of trust can 
undermine notions of consensus-based policing, 
which in turn undermines citizen security. How-
ever, under a crime prevention framework, issues 
of trust are focused solely on the individual, with 
technology offering accurate methods of compil-
ing digital trust profiles of citizen behavior (Lips et 
al., 2009). Our research indicates the institutional 
trust profiles, which encompass the public police 
who endorse the deployment of this technology, 
venue licensees, their security personnel or door 
staff, and the system administrators, involve 
several implied dimensions that are barely ques-
tioned, and although given adequate protection 
under current Australian state and federal privacy 
laws, appear to have limited direct applicability 
to ID scanners. This implied trust is indicative of 
a broader problem relating to the enforcement of 
privacy law in Australia (Greenleaf et al., 2007), 
but is compounded by equating privacy concerns 
with potential disorder. This schism between the 
legal right to privacy and the cultural conception 
of privacy as a nuisance that compromises good 
order or the well-intentioned use of technology 
to promote safety, generates two key problems.
First, privacy is secondary or peripheral to the 
overarching goal of improved physical safety. This 
is facilitated by current privacy legislation which 
determines a ‘legal purpose’ for data collection 
by using extremely unclear criteria. This logic 
reinforces the ‘success’ of ID scanners in regaining 
order within the contemporary night-time econo-
my, while undermining the rights of all nightclub 
patrons, including those who are well-behaved. 
The popular belief that only those who might cause 
trouble are affected by the privacy implications 
of ID scanning is misconceived, yet is viewed as 
somehow contradicting the law or undermining the 
more pressing concern for improved safety. This 
turns the privacy question on its head to reinforce 
the trust in ID scanning as ‘the solution’ to the 
problem of alcohol-related violence and disorder. 
As such, any privacy objections are irrelevant 
as the system is foolproof and contains several 
in-built technical and administrative protections. 
However, the foolproof nature of these systems is 
undermined by human methods of administering 
the technology, with observational data indicating 
a substantial proportion of nightclub patrons are 
rarely scanned before entering ‘at risk’ venues.
Second, these issues feed the broader political 
endorsement of ID scanners, which further rel-
egates privacy to something that can be conceded 
in the quest to improve human security. This 
technological determinism prevails regardless of 
any substantive proof ID scanners actually reduce 
violence and anti-social behavior in the night-time 
economy. The endorsement of ID scanners by the 
QLALJSC (2010) in the face of an extensive list 
of unanswered privacy issues, exemplifies how 
problematic elements of e-governance are filter-
ing into a more punitive regulatory landscape. 
Osmond (2010), Zedner (2010) and Matthews 
(2009) highlight how the political quest to ‘solve 
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problems’ associated with crime and disorder 
through more problematic legal criteria is reshap-
ing the very meaning of the criminal law. These 
issues are compounded where accountability for 
multiple public or private agencies is concerned. 
When new technology is married to legal standards 
aimed at ensuring organizational compliance, the 
incremental erosion of individual rights emerges in 
several ways. As Thompson and Genosko (2009) 
indicate, paternalistic motives justifying complex 
bureaucratic social sorting procedures are not 
necessarily confined to new or innovative forms of 
technology. Rather, the lack of capacity to formally 
challenge the ‘back end’ surveillant assemblages 
through countervailing criminal, administrative or 
human rights protections reinforces the imperme-
ability of data about people as the ‘truth’ associated 
with their behavior. With privacy subordinated 
by safety, this legal and political impermeability 
overplays the value of technology in promoting 
human welfare, while raising a more problematic 
series of legal issues that are difficult to contest 
when data equates with truth.
Future research into the connections between 
safety, technology, überveillance and the con-
struction of surveillant assemblages should focus 
away from simple cause and effect relationships 
between new technologies and crime prevention. 
Rather, the more complex issues associated with 
e-governance, citizenship and competing rights 
justify closer analysis. This requires developing 
research methods that unravel how policies rely-
ing on the value of new technology to protect the 
community can equally respect individual and col-
lective rights to public and private organizational 
accountability, transparency in the uses of personal 
information and citizen capacity to challenge 
government interference through meaningful legal 
and conceptual measures.
CONCLUSION
There is no doubt that technology contributes to 
überveillance to streamline contemporary gov-
ernance. However, the mentalities driving the 
acceptance of new technologies that are built on 
notions of cause and effect ‘success’ lead to the 
development of new and highly selective citizen-
ship criteria. Governments have always done this 
without necessarily relying on the use of technol-
ogy to enhance human surveillance. The foregoing 
discussion illustrates governments, private entities 
and citizens have a skewed and unclear perception 
of the value and meaning of privacy as a legal 
right worthy of protection when contrasted with 
the seemingly greater demands for human security. 
Future research and policy should investigate how 
competing rights to security and privacy might 
unwittingly favor the expansion of technology 
to promote greater citizen compliance, while 
simultaneously reducing the availability of legal 
and cultural mechanisms that challenge complex 
social sorting procedures driving contemporary 
e-citizenship.
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KEY TERMS AND DEFINITIONS
Dataveillance: The tendency for governments 
and private businesses to monitor populations 
and consumer behaviour, then use the resulting 
computerised data to develop formal policies. 
Frequently, decisions about public or private 
service provision are based on the data about a 
person, rather than the person themselves (see 
surveillant assemblage).
Due Process: The series of rules, procedures 
and rights designed to protect the individual 
against the power of the state, which constrains 
the activities of state agencies in dealing with 
citizens under the criminal law. Examples of 
rules that involve due process include the right 
to silence, the right to legal representation during 
police questioning and the obligation on police to 
have clear evidence of criminal behaviour before 
entering and searching private property.
e-Governance: The use of computerised meth-
ods of data collection and sorting to streamline 
government and public service delivery.
ID Scanner: An electronic device comprising 
various technologies, including a portable camera, 
image scanner, biometric fingerprint reader and 
computer, designed to create a replica of a person’s 
identity documents to ensure authorised entry 
into public or private premises. In the night-time 
economy, these devices enable a person’s identity 
to be collected and stored in a licensed venue and/
or a computer network to enable security person-
nel to prevent undesirable or banned patrons from 
gaining entry. These technologies are considered 
to minimise the prospect of disorder and violence 
occurring within hotels and nightclubs due to 
their potential deterrence effects, and their ability 
to enhance the rapid identification and detection 
of offenders.
Night-Time Economy: The development of 
urban precincts to enable increased commercial 
trade, largely through entertainment, restaurants 
and licensed venues, that are specifically promoted 
to operate outside of daytime business hours.
Privacy: The series of legal protections gov-
erning the use of personal information for public 
and private service delivery.
Public Policing: Government agencies and 
agents with specific legal powers to help promote 
order and investigate crime for the public benefit.
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Security: The range of human and techno-
logical measures designed to prevent losses to 
governmental agencies, private businesses and the 
community. Security is commonly linked to pre-
venting crime, rather than prosecuting suspected 
offenders after a crime has been committed.
Surveillant Assemblage: This involves the 
activities of multiple agencies (state, non-state 
and hybrid) engaged in surveillance and the vari-
ous processes, forms and purposes of conducting 
surveillance, involving the consolidation of data 
through information sharing networks or other 
means (such as the sale of access to database 
information or secret court orders demanding 
technology companies transfer megadata to state 
agencies) to create more intensive and comprehen-
sive surveillance and data sorting capacities. This 
data can then be used to inform policing practices 
to target or distinguish between ‘desirable’ and 
‘undesirable’ people in a range of settings, and is 
further intensified by the use of computerised sur-
veillance technologies to enforce such divisions.
Technological Determinism: The belief that 
automated technologies can solve complex social 
problems, including crime.
